Bruce
Attack Analysis 6
Attack Analysis 6 is a set of photos looking inside the break in the bow. At this point we don’t have a hypothesis supported by photographic evidence as to the cause of the pinched in effect. Note the annotated photo from Ed Walson and the photo showing the ‘pinched in effect” from Michael Houston
Some important help
John Fakan, who is involved with the USS Cod Memorial has offered to help in this investigation. http://www.usscod.org/tour.html His comment:
“COD’s keel was laid just seven months after GRUNION was launched, and both were built in the same yard using the same design. Though all fleet submarines of that era are very similar in general there can be fairly significant differences in details between EB boats and those built elsewhere by others. With COD we have the advantage of being able to make detailed measurements of the actual hull, and we do have extensive drawings on hand that likely apply equally well to GRUNION. In fact, many of the drawings will be identical to GRUNION’s and will list her name along with COD and other boats covered by those drawings. That means we would actually have many or most of GRUNION’s drawings in hand.”
A Turning Point ??
It is dangerous to draw strong conclusions at this point in the investigation. However, it may be valid to state that the hypothesis that the conning tower was holed by a shot from the Kano Maru is inconsistent with the photographic evidence of hydrostatic damage (accordion style) to the conning tower. Hopefully if anybody can see how it is possible to get hydrostatic damage to the conning tower after it was penetrated by a three inch shell they will respond. It may be an important turning point in this investigation.
More on the open Aft Battery Hatch
David Decrevel has provided several photos of the Aft Battery Hatch that may be helpful in understanding what happened there. They have been added to Attack Analysis 2
To clarify, the photo ’scan0040′ Bruce has posted in the ‘Open Hatch’ album, is NOT the After Battery hatch. It is the upper Conning Tower hatch, and was posted merely to provide one example of the operating principle of a typical hatch dogging arrangement. The photo was taken in the mid 1960’s on a Balao Class, EB built boat.
An Opinion-Grunion Surfacing
I do not know if the premise that Grunion was attempting to ‘battle surface’ for a gun action with Kano Maru has been generally dismissed, but for any still contemplating such a scenario, here is my perspective. It is only my personal opinion. I tried to imagine myself in LCDR. Alebe’s shoes and examine the situation strictly from a logical standpoint.
In my opinion, Grunion was neither surfacing, nor had any intention to do so. 2 days before the reported attack on Grunion, Captain Alebe reported ‘heavy anti-submarine activity’. Earlier, while patrolling in the area off Kiska Harbor, Grunion sighted, and attacked ‘destroyers’, and ‘destroyer-type vessels”. The fact that ‘destroyers’ were later determined to be smaller ‘sub chasers’ has no bearing. Periscope observations quite often provided a less than ideal view, especially at night, and it was not at all unusual for skippers to misidentify targets. The fact is, Captain Alebe thought they were ‘destroyers’ and ‘destroyer type vessels’. There is no direct evidence that Grunion was aware of enemy aircraft on Kiska Island, but if U.S. intelligence knew of it, or suspected it, Captain Alebe would have been made aware of the possibility, prior to leaving on patrol. Captain Alebe was an experienced submarine skipper, so logically, it is highly likely he would consider the possibility of encountering enemy aircraft, whether or not any had been reported or sighted.
If the eyewitness account is to be believed, during Grunion’s attack, Kano Maru fired 84 8cm shells at Grunion’s periscope. The range was “very near”, then 300 meters, and then 400 meters. No mention is made that the submarine was ON the surface, only that “conning tower made ripple on the surface and the wave began washing the conning tower”. The possibility exists that this could have been the periscope shears, or even the fairwater, if Grunion had broached, or merely just the periscope wake. The point being, Grunion was not ON the surface, and therefore the After Battery hatch would NOT have been open.
I strongly believe the following facts apply to Grunion: 1) Captain Alebe knew he was close aboard an enemy held island and was just off Kiska Harbor. 2) He knew destroyers had recently been in the area of Kiska Harbor. 3) He most likely knew that the possibility existed that enemy aircraft could be in the vicinity. 4) He knew he was taking sustained gunfire from Kano Maru. 5) He knew that a ‘hit’ from Kano Maru could, in any of a number of critical places on Grunion, render the boat unable to dive. (Main induction as an example.) 6) There was no way for Captain Alebe to be aware that Kano Maru’s radio was out of commission, and his logical assumption would be that following the first attack and torpedo hit, Kano Maru would attempt to summon help via radio. (According to the eye witness, Kano Maru did indeed attempt to summon help, from the sound of its’ own gunfire.) 7) Most likely, some torpedoes remained aboard Grunion, in one or both of the torpedo rooms.
Captain Alebe knew that Kano Maru wasn’t going anywhere; the target was dead in the water, providing him a much easier torpedo firing solution. 9) Captain Alebe would know, that by surfacing, he would needlessly give up one major advantage he had, that of being underwater, and essential ‘invisible’. 10) One does not rise to command of a submarine by being foolish, and Grunion was Captain Alebe’s second submarine command.
Keeping in mind what Ned Beach reported, the official report did not, from what we’ve been told, include the part about “Torpedoes expended aft”. Following Grunion’s last message she was ordered to return to Dutch Harbor. She had only been on patrol for 30 days, and had ten torpedoes remaining, nearly a half load. The normal ‘load’ for the After Torpedo Room was 8 fish, so at the time of her message, Grunion would have had at least 2 fish remaining forward. There could have been any number of reasons for the order to return to Dutch Harbor, but if the reason was because of the number of torpedoes remaining, logically, she would have been more likely ordered home if most of the fish she had remaining were in the after room, and that nearly all fish in the forward room had been expended. My sense is that the ‘all torpedoes expended aft’ might not be accurate, and the possibility has to exist that there were some fish aft.
Following the first attack and hit, according to the eye witness, Grunion maneuvered aft off Kano Maru’s starboard side and fired a second salvo, and continued to maneuver, to off the port side aft, and fired a third salvo. 4 distinct possibilities come to mind for why Captain Alebe would do this. 1) To avoid the direct gunfire from Kano Maru, and reduce the possibility of any damage to Grunion, even to the periscope; or 2) to take his time and maneuver for a more favorable torpedo setup; or 3) he did have torpedoes left in the after room, and wanted to bring the stern tubes to bear; or 4) all of the above. Logically, if you have no concerns about the gunfire, or your setup, why not just stay where you are and fire a second salvo, and, if needed, a third salvo? Logically, why cautiously take the time, 20 minutes according to the witness, maneuvering and obtaining 3 separate firing solutions, only to then immediately ‘give up’, and decide to risk surfacing for a gun action, only a mere 400 meters off the target? (The reported maximum range of the 3-inch/50 submarine deck gun is just over 16,000 yards!).
Grunion was not ‘rushed for time’; they had nothing BUT time, and they likely had some torpedoes remaining. If ‘all torpedoes expended aft’ is true, then Grunion had fired all 6 forward tubes. The eyewitness observed 2 wakes from the first salvo, one from second salvo, and 3 from the third salvo. Conceivably, this could leave Grunion with as many as 4 torpedoes left aboard forward. If this was the case, logically, Grunion would have stayed submerged, ‘stood off’ some distance, and reloaded her remaining fish, and returned for another try. Grunion had been ordered home, logically, why go home with fish remaining aboard, and a target ripe for sinking from your most lethal weapon? Even with misses and duds, logically, one would continue to utilize the best weapon available, and one that had the most likely chance of sinking a large, valuable target.
If these six shots were the last of Grunion’s torpedoes because of earlier unreported firings, although unlikely, it is the only scenario I can perceive where Captain Alebe would risk going to the surface to try and ‘finish off’ the target with gunfire. If indeed he decided on this risky course of action, logically, he would have maneuvered Grunion such as to increase the range by a substantial margin to reduce the risk to his boat and crew. It’s obvious that Captain Alebe wanted to see Kano Maru go to the bottom, and submarine skippers were encouraged to be aggressive, but they were not encouraged to be reckless.
Submarine ‘battle surface with gun action’ became more and more prevalent as the war progressed, but research has shown that on most occasions in WWII, a submarine conducting a ‘battle surface gun action’, in daylight, did so in areas not subject to recent extensive ASW coverage, and only in very few instances, when the proposed target was shooting back with anything heavier than small arms. Most gun actions were against small targets that were not worthy of a torpedo, or against somewhat heavier targets when the submarine had expended all its’ torpedoes. There were some occasions where a submarine “battle surfaced’ in close contact with enemy forces to ‘fight it out’, but this was when they had no other choice and it was a final option. There were also times when a ‘battle surface’ turned very dangerous, and more than one was highly risky, but I’ve found none that could be considered ‘foolhardy’.
The notion that a submarine in Grunion’s situation, would surface at close range, (within 3 to 4 boat-lengths), and “duke it out” with a large, armed and firing enemy ship is not, in my opinion, logical. Once again, this is strictly my opinion based on known facts and conjecture. Alternative opinions and perspectives are more than welcome.
Terry Terrass
Circular Run Hypothesis – Notwithstanding the release of the many ROV pictures some comments still seem to accept the circular torpedo run hypothesis. The extensive hull damage shown seems much more consistent with gunfire damage than damage caused by a circular run. To an inexperienced observer on the KANO MARU, the circular bubble path observed might be confused with a circular torpedo run. A more realistic explanation is that the bubbles came from air leaking past a leaking torpedo tube muzzle door as the tube was being blown down while GRUNION was making a 180 degree turn to reverse course. The following points all support this view:
1. GRUNION had just fired all six of the loaded torpedoes and needed to reload the four remaining torpedoes.
2. The first step in reloading is to close the muzzle door and blow down the tube to remove the sea water from the tube after the torpedo has been fired.
3. Given that the KANO MARU had not yet been sunk, GRUNION would have been trying to reload as expeditiously as possible.
4. The Japanese reports describe what happened to each of the six torpedoes fired. The only possibility of a circular run would have been #6 but it was reported to have missed astern. If it had then turned into a circular run it would have been observed by more people on KANO MARU.
5. If the GRUNION had been hit by one of its own torpedoes which exploded, the noise would have been much louder than was reported. Notwithstanding the distance to GRUNION, it would seem that the explosion heard did not come even close to matching the “rumbling of the hell ground” sound heard by Aiura when torpedo #2 exploded upon hitting KANO MARU.
6. Circular runs were NOT a problem before 1944 when they caused the loss of two boats, TULLIBEE in March and TANG in October. While torpedoes from the Newport Torpedo Station had severe design problems their manufacturing workmanship was excellent. Such was not the case with torpedoes made by the private contractors brought in later to alleviate the torpedo shortage as the war went on.
Gun Fire Damage – The Japanese report describes only one 8cm gun shell hit, the 84th and last shot which may have exploded. It appears to me that not all of the extensive damage depicted by the pictures can be attributed to the sinking and the long slide to the bottom and that at least some is due to the impact of shells hitting the superstructure even if they did not explode. If GRUNION’s periscope remained up throughout its course reversal, as reported, the gunners would have had a good aiming point. The effect on the shells of hitting the water is not known but it seems reasonable to assume that they would have been slowed but not stopped until they had traveled some distance, probably further than would have been needed to reach the superstructure which would have been only about 35 feet below the surface.. Although the force of the impact may not have been sufficient to cause the shells to detonate, it is likely that they could have caused much of the damage apparent in the pictures. And if the shells did not detonate, the gunners may have seen only the splashes as they hit the water and would have remained unaware of any damage they may have caused. Because much of the firing undoubtedly occurred as GRUNION was reversing course the shells would have hit at different angles producing different types of damage.
Topside Hatches -
1. The hand grab rail in place for the after battery hatch does not necessarily imply that GRUNION was starting to man the 3 inch gun. It could have been left in place after dumping garbage from the main deck (more convenient if the sea was calm) because of an urgent need to submerge or to increase speed, perhaps preliminary to making the attack on the KANO MARU. The designed gun access was a door in the after end of the conning tower.
2. GRUNION did NOT have a blanking plate under its after-battery deck hatch. This is based upon information from page 88 of John Alden’s book, “The Fleet Submarine in the U.S. Navy”, stating that back-up blanking plates on deck hatches were not added until after getting war damage reports of the deck hatches being lifted off their seats by close explosions. These plates, developed by Portsmouth Navy Yard personnel, are credited with saving USS SALMON (SS 182) on 30 October 1944 after it received a depth charging so severe the ship was taken out of service.
3. As yet I do not believe that anything conclusive has emerged to explain the available views of the after battery deck hatch and the upper conning tower hatch. I note that for the after battery hatch the center dog is opposite the hatch spring whereas for the conning tower hatch (as shown on Scan0040) the center dog is at the center of the hatch spring. Is it possible that deformation of the trunk and hatch seat, together with the differing dog positions, explains why the conning tower hatch is deformed while the after battery hatch may have opened because of the hatch spring?
4. I may have missed it but is there any view of the torpedo loading hatch? I would have guessed that the bow was more likely to have broken there than further forward.
Terry Terrass
I have one comment on Terry’s post. In item #6, that “circular runs were NOT a problem before 1944”. The definitive cause of loss of Tullibee and Tang was not determined until after the end of the war when the survivors returned home from POW camps. At times during the war, skippers reported experiencing circular runs of torpedoes. They observed this from periscope observation and/or sound, and had to maneuver quickly to avoid. I recall one instance when a boat reported a circular run, and while they were increasing depth to avoid, the torpedo passed over the bow. I will research this and provide details of the boat, and when it occurred.
Not the one I was thinking of, but according to ‘United States Submarine Operations in World War II’, Triton SS-201, “On March 7” (1943) “she reported…….One of her torpedoes made a circular run which forced her to go deep.” The ‘go deep’ indicates to me that Triton was submerged at the time. On March 23, 1943, Whale SS-239, “Whale fired a fourth torpedo which ran “hot, straight and normal”—for one minute, then circled, heading back in the direction of Whale. “We went to 120 feet and prayed”, the commanding officer later reported. The erratic torpedo changed its mind after reaching Whale’s beam and headed back for the freighter, finally exploding.” (Wikipedia)
We know, from eyewitness report, that 2 boats were lost after being struck by their own torpedo’s circular run. There were reports of other instances of circular runs, so it seems conceivable that other boats could have succumbed to a similar fate, unfortunately with no survivors to testify to the fact.
For John Fakan of USS Cod Memoriall. Were Cod or Grunion equipted with ‘Garbage Ejector’ in Aft Battery Mess Area? This relates to the repeated comments of ‘dumping trash or garbage from After Battery Hatch. By mid sixties all ‘Wet Garbage’ ie; mess hall slops were loaded into bio-degradeable green mesh bags, added a steel plate ‘garbabe weight’ to assure it all sank and ejected several times a day.
I don’t believe Grunion or any other submarine were allowed to dump garbage in a War Zone or in War Time for that matter. There were probably regulations against cigarette butts being thrown overboard while on Patrol
Ed…
The dumping of garbage is mentioned in numerous patrol accounts, annecdotes, and period books (written by sub skippers/crew). They even mention the need to carry additional weights for the bags, and complain about the cooks not “double wrapping” the wet stuff.
Remember “Bungo Pete” recovering the EELs garbage in one of the books by Beach?
In answer to Ed Walson’s query, COD does not have a garbage ejector. I am unaware of any EB boat from that era being equiped with such a device.
John Fakan
John and Ed. My blueprint of Charr from the early 50’s shows the GDU (Garbage Disposal Unit), which I would guess was installed at the time of her conversion to ‘fleet snorkel’ in 1951. With the GUPPY and FS conversions, boats were rarely, if ever, surfacing at night, so garbage could no longer be thrown over the side. The GDU had become necessary. Redfish SS-395 was never converted to GUPPY or FS, and as I have a good friend who rode her, I’ll ask if she was so equipped.
Ah, ‘das snorkle’, all very clear and logical now. Thanks. My original query on the presence of a GDU unit was related to the AFB hatch hand rails and the theory’s that Grunion was surfaced and ‘dumping garbage’ from that hatch.
‘Rig for Dive’ was a formal condition that allowed the Conning Tower Hatch to be open at various times during operations. But to open the ABH, at sea, at night, in a war zone, in the Bering Sea would still have taken a small act of congress. I still don’t think this happened. They may have dumped slops and sinkables from the bridge hatch. Under these conditions I suppose there were no other options.
I concluded that the hand rail at ABH was left in position for some other reason. Note also, the stanchions and steel wire life lines remained rigged in position. It would take very little damage to see these wires trailing behind a boat and getting in the screws at an awkward momement. Was this a common practice during this time period?
Although the Grunion had eliminated 2/3rds of the Kiska/Attu surface ASW fleet a couple of days prior to this, (Subchasers #23 & #24) I don’t think they would have fully appreciated that fact. I don’t think they would have allowed any floating debris or other calling cards to mark their lurking point when only 12-20 miles offshore of the harbour they were guarding.